The American Judiciary, page 80 by Simeon E. Baldwin

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81

e new meaning or application have but echoed the voice of the bar.

The greatest achievements of Marshall in this direction were really but a statement of his approbation of positions laid down before him by Daniel Webster. In the early stages of the Dartmouth College case, when it was before the State courts in New Hampshire, it was Webster and his associates, Jeremiah Mason and Jeremiah Smith, both lawyers of the highest rank, who first put forward the doctrine that the charter of a private corporation was a contract; and when the cause came before the Supreme Court of the United States it fell to the lot of Webster to bring it to the attention of the great Chief Justice.[Footnote: "Works of Daniel Webster," V, 497.] So in the Florida case it was he, in supporting the cause of the prevailing party, who suggested that the Territory of Florida, though owned by the United States, was no part of them. "By the law of England," he went on to say, "when possession is taken of territories, the king, Jure Corona, has the power of legislation until parliament shall interfere. Congress have the Jus Corona in this case, and Florida was to be governed by Congress as she thought proper."[Footnote: American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters' Reports, 611, 538.]

This argument did not spend its force in its effect on Marshall. When, after the lapse of two generations, greater problems of the relations of the United States to territory newly acquired from Spain arose, it was, as has been said above, made one of the cornerstones of the opinion of the same court which determined what they were.[Footnote: Downes v. Bidwell, 182 United States Reports, 244, 265.]

So in the Hurtado case, which has been described at length, no description of due process of law was found better and none is better than that given by Webster so many years before in the Dartmouth College case. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, from whose judgment that cause came up by writ of error, had held--and on

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