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erest of scientific play, if, except when all suits are stopped, the theory, "Too strong to take the partner out of the No-trump," had never been conceived, and would never again be advanced.
The same comment applies with equal force to the remark so often heard, "Partner, I was too weak to take you out."
This generally emanates from a Third Hand who has a five- or six-card suit in a trickless hand. He does not stop to realize that his hand will not aid his partner's No-trump to the extent of a single trick, but that in a Trump declaration, it will almost certainly take two tricks. The Trump bid only increases the commitment by one, so it is obviously a saving and advantageous play. Furthermore, it prevents the adversaries from running a long suit. It, also, in Clubs and Diamonds, is a real danger signal, and, in the probable event of a bid by the Fourth Hand, warns the partner away from two No-trumps.
The advocates of the weakness take-out realize that in exceptional instances the play may result most unfortunately. When the Dealer has called a border-line No-trump, without any strength in the suit named by the Third Hand, and one of the adversaries has great length and strength in that suit, a heavy loss is bound to ensue, which may be increased 100 by the advance of the bid from one to two. This case is, indeed, rare, and when it does turn up the chances are that the Declarer will escape a double, as the holder of the big Trumps will fear the Dealer may be able to come to the rescue if he point out the danger by doubling the suit call.
The fact, however, that a play at times works badly is not a sufficient argument against its use, if in the majority of cases it prove advantageous, and that is unquestionably true of the weakness take-out.
The strength take-out, above advocated, applies only to Spades and Hearts. With Diamonds and Clubs, at a love score, the distance to go for game is in most cases too great to make it advisable, but the weakness take-out should be used equall