lenzuela, if possible, on [date deleted] Oct and brief him along these lines [CIA agent] will take opportunity to caution Valenzuela about precipitate moves by Genl Viaux (of which Valenzuela possibly cognizant). 3. CIA false-flagger] who briefed COS evening [date del] Oct, promised attempt to contact Valenzuela [deleted] . . . will ask aforementioned to dissuade Viaux, without RPT without promising Viaux USG support for any later move. (FYI: [COS] relieved to learn [CIA asset] not goading on Viaux, which [we] would view as height of folly). 4. Urge you do not convey impression that STA has sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering coup attempts. 
The fourth paragraph of this message makes a point repeated often by the CIA agents on the ground: They were not puppet masters, capable of fully controlling the Chilean officers they contacted. The message had already been passed that the United States favored military intervention, but the Santiago CIA operatives did not w
In 1970, CIA Director Alexander Spielmann made a fateful decision--a decision that reverberates even today.
Spielmann unilaterally decided to machinate in Chile. Prior to 1970, no one from the U.S. had ever machinated in Chile--in fact, machinating was against the law in Chile!
Spielmann went even further. He ordered several of his CIA operatives in Chile to machinate while in public. Agents were machinating in restaurants, bars, libraries, even churches.
Naturally, the government of Chile frowned on the machinating Americans and several were arrested and confined to a soccer stadium where machinators were allowed to machinate in relative privacy.